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Abstract
We consider a second price auction between bidders with indepen-
dently and identically distributed valuations, where a losing bidder
suffers a negative direct externality. Considering ex-ante commitments
to form bidding rings we study the question of core stability of the
grand coalition, namely: is there a subset of bidders that prefers form-
ing a small bidding ring rather than participating in the grand cartel?
We show that in the presence of direct externalities between bidders
the grand coalition is not necessarily core stable, as opposed to the
zero externality case, where the stability of the grand coalition is a
known result. Finally, we study collusion in auctions as a mechanism
design problem, insisting on the difficulty to compare ex-ante and in-
terim commitments. In particular, we show that there are situations
in which bidders prefer colluding before privately learning their types.
Keywords: Auctions, collusion, externalities, Bayesian games, core, partition
function game, mechanism design.
JEL classification: C71, C72, D44.
1 Introduction
The question of collusion in auctions receives great attention in the auction
theory literature. From an empirical point of view, there is clear evidence
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of collusion in real life auctions and auction-like situations, although strictly
prohibited in many countries. From a theoretical point of view, collusion in
auctions provides a great challenge as the formation of bidding rings violates
the symmetry between bidders, which is a common assumption in auction
theory.
We address the question of collusion in auctions in the presence of direct
externalities between bidders, focusing on the grand coalition, i.e., a bidding
ring that includes all bidders. We examine the core stability of the grand
coalition, as early as in the ex-ante stage, namely, before bidders learn their
types. Our main goal is to answer the question: Is the grand coalition
plausible in the presence of externalities, in the sense that no group of bidders
prefers seceding?
1.1 A 3-player art auction example
The following example demonstrates the motivation to our work. Consider
three art collectors who wish to acquire a valuable piece of art in a future
auction. We assume that the object receives a restricted attention in the
market, and that the three art collectors are the only possible potential bid-
ders, a fact which is common knowledge. For the time being the auction
house publishes a catalog with some details about the art object, however,
the object itself is not yet available for close examination by the interested
potential bidders or experts on their behalf. As such an examination is nec-
essary in order to determine the true value of such a valuable object (e.g.,
to determine how well preserved it is), the three collectors can only have
a rough estimation regarding their valuations in the planned auction. We,
therefore, interpret this stage as the ex-ante stage.
As art collectors extremely vary in their personal preferences (e.g., per-
sonal taste), the value that they assign to the good (once it is finally accessible
for a close inspection) is considered private.
A losing bidder in this example suffers a negative utility (i.e., direct ex-
ternality). For instance, if the auctioned object is part of a collection, losing
the auction may result in a decrease of value of other works of art that the
losing collector already owns from the same collection.1
The formation of a bidding ring prior to the auction can be profitable.
For instance, full cooperation between the three collectors will eliminate com-
1As opposed to art dealers, art collectors do not buy in order to resell.
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pletely the competition in the auction (bid rigging), allowing them to win
the object for a low price. Note, however, that in such a case the collector
who will eventually own the good will most probably need to compensate the
other ring members for their expected loss (i.e., externality). The presence
of externalities may therefore interfere with cooperation.
We wish to see to which extent, in the presence of externalities, an ex-ante
commitment of the grand coalition is plausible, in the sense that no group
of players wishes to secede. In example 5.1 we demonstrate a market where
a player, anticipating that the two other players will continue cooperating if
he secedes, finds it profitable to deviate in the presence of externalities.2 In
such a setup, the grand coalition is said to be ”instable”.
1.2 Related Literature
Empirical evidence of collusion, and in particular of partial collusion, i.e.,
bidding rings which do not include all bidders, can be found in the work of
Porter and Zona (1999) who find proof of bid rigging in school milk procure-
ment in Ohio, as well as in Porter and Zona (1993) who study Long-Island
highway construction contracts. Bajari and Ye (2003) study collusion in
Midwest seal coats contracts. In particular, these studies provide some in-
teresting links between observed bidders’ behavior and theoretical notions.
For example, Porter and Zona (1993) describe bidding rings that participate
in several auctions, which can be interpreted as an ex-ante commitment, as
ring members commit to cooperate in several auctions before learning the
considered auctions’ details, and in particular, before learning their private
types.
With the help of mechanism design tools, the question of collusion in
private value auctions without externalities was studied in, e.g., McAfee
and McMillan (1992) who consider first price auctions, Mailath and Zem-
sky (1991), and Graham and Marshall (1987) who study collusion in second
price auctions, and Marshall and Marx (2007) and Robinson (1985) who
compare between first and second price auctions in order to find which is
more vulnerable to bidder collusion.
We follow the model of markets with direct externalities between play-
ers, which was studied by Caillaud and Jehiel (1998) and Jehiel, Moldovanu
2For the sake of simplicity we demonstrate the secession of a single player rather than
of a group of players. In order to demonstrate the secession of a group of players one needs
to consider a larger market which significantly complicates the computations.
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and Stacchetti (1999) in incomplete information setups, as well as by Jehiel
and Moldovanu (1996, 1999) and Jehiel, Moldovanu and Stacchetti (1996) in
complete information. Caillaud and Jehiel (1998) study collusion in identi-
cally distributed independent private value second price auctions with direct
externalities, however, they do not consider the seceding of coalitions but of
individuals only. The question of partial collusion, i.e., the formation of bid-
ding rings smaller than the grand coalition, in complete information auctions
with direct externalities was studied by Biran (2009).
The property of core-stability, to which we refer in this paper, was pre-
sented by Biran and Forges (2011), who develop tools to study the plausibility
of coalitions in Bayesian games. They propose an application of core-stability
of bidding rings in independent private value (first and second price) auctions.
They also consider examples of instability in the presence of direct external-
ities with complete information. One of the key notions in their work, which
naturally plays an important role in the current paper as well, is coalitional
equilibrium in games with incomplete information, extending the work of
Ray and Vohra (1997) and Ray (2007). When discussing core stability we
rely on two basic core notions, the core with merging expectations introduced
by Maskin (2003), and the core with singleton expectations introduced by
Hafalir (2007).
Following Biran and Forges (2011) we focus on core-stability in the ex-
ante stage. The literature which deals with ring formation in the ex-ante
stage includes, e.g., Bajari (2001), Waehrer (1999), and Marshall et al.
(1994). The question of ex-ante commitment to an incentive compatible
(I.C.) mechanism was addressed by, e.g., Forges, Mertens and Vohra (2002)
and Forges and Minelli (2001).
1.3 Core-stability
As in the model of Caillaud and Jehiel (1998), we consider a second price
auction with a reserve price organized between a set of bidders with indepen-
dent private values which are identically distributed. A losing bidder suffers a
deterministic negative externality which is not identity dependent and hence
assumed to be of common knowledge.
As we wish to study bidder collusion, given a partition of bidders, we
define an auxiliary auction game in which the players are bidding rings,
namely, cells in the considered partition.
Consider the existence of a Nash equilibrium in every auxiliary game,
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with respect to ex-ante expected utilities. In other words, for every bidder
partition assume the existence of a coalitional equilibrium of a second price
auction held between the bidding rings in this partition. Such a mapping
of bidder partitions to coalitional equilibria, defines a partition form game
(see, e.g., Lucas and Thrall (1963)), in which the value of a coalition (given
a partition in which it is a cell) is its ex-ante expected utility in a Nash
equilibrium of the corresponding auxiliary game.
Biran and Forges (2011) prove that with appropriate transfer payments
between coalition members a coalitional equilibrium can be made I.C. More
precisely, the latter results from their proposition 1 where they show that
for any coalition S, given a strategy of the others and a best response for
S, there exists a mechanism for S, composed of an exactly balanced transfer
scheme between the members of S and the best response strategy of S, such
that this mechanism is I.C. We therefore assume, thus WLOG, that types are
common knowledge inside a coalition. In particular, the type of a bidding
ring in the auxiliary game is the highest valuation of its members (net of
their externalities).
Consider a mapping which determines the conjecture of every coalition
on the behavior (i.e., partitioning) of the others if it decides to deviate and
secede from the grand coalition. Namely, to every coalition we assign a
partition in which it is a cell. With respect to this mapping the previously
described partition form game reduces to a characteristic form game. The
grand coalition is said to be core-stable if the core of this characteristic form
game is not empty. The interpretation is that the grand coalition is plausible
as no subset of bidders has an interest to deviate.
In order to examine the question of the stability of the grand coalition in
auctions with externalities, we start by proving the existence of a coalitional
equilibrium for any given bidder partition. Note that as opposed to the
non-collusive auction game in which bidders are symmetric, in an auxiliary
auction game the ”bidders” (i.e., bidding rings) are asymmetric. Symmetry
between bidders is violated in two senses in the auxiliary auction game.
First, while bidders’ valuations are distributed identically in the non-collusive
auction, in the auxiliary auction each bidding ring has a different distribution
which depends on its size. That is as the type of a bidding ring is the maximal
valuation of its members.
Second, in the non-collusive auction externalities on a losing bidder are
not identity dependent. A losing bidder suffers the same externality regard-
less of his (or the winner’s) identity. In an auxiliary auction it is no longer
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true. The externality of a losing ring is cumulative and is a function of its
size, as every member of the ring suffers a personal externality due to a loss.
These two aspects of asymmetry introduce significant complications in the
equilibrium analysis.
In this model Caillaud and Jehiel (1998) already identified an equilibrium
in symmetric auctions with externalities where all bidders act individually
(i.e., no bidding rings are allowed). They proved that bidding the difference
between one’s type and the externality term whenever the type exceeds the
reservation price (and making an irrelevant bid otherwise) is in equilibrium.
The reservation price therefore serves as a participation threshold for bidders.
This equilibrium, however, depends crucially on the fact that bidders have
identical distribution functions, and does not extend to asymmetric setups,
where bidding rings (with nonidentical distribution functions) are considered.
In order to prove the existence of equilibrium in asymmetric collusive
auctions (i.e., the auxiliary auction game), where each participating bidding
ring has a different distribution function, we borrow the idea of participation
thresholds. We prove that for any collusion scheme (i.e., bidder partition)
there exist in the corresponding (asymmetric) auxiliary auction game par-
ticipation thresholds which constitute an equilibrium. Specifically, given a
strategy of the others, a ring has a threshold type between the reservation
price and the sum of the reservation price and the ring’s negative externality,
such that if the ring’s type is higher than its threshold type its best response
is to bid the difference between its type and its externality, and whenever
its type is lower than the threshold type its best response is to make an
irrelevant bid.
We then rely on two specific mappings defining the conjecture of a seced-
ing coalition regarding the partitioning of the others, starting with Maskin’s
(2003) merging expectations (see also, Hafalir (2007)). With merging expec-
tations a seceding coalition expects the others to form the complementary
coalition. Such an assumption yields an auxiliary auction game with two
(usually asymmetric) bidders. Afterwards we consider the case where due to
the secession of a coalition cooperation breaks down completely, as a result of
which bidders outside the seceding coalition act individually. Hafalir (2007)
refers to such a scenario as singleton expectations. It yields an auction game
in which a ”strong” bidder competes with ”weak” bidders (see also, e.g.,
Maskin and Riley (2000)). We compute explicitly the participation thresh-
olds of the coalitions in these two cases.
Once the equilibrium analysis is completed and the question of stability
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is to be addressed, for the sake of simplicity, we restrict our attention to an
auction with three bidders.3 As opposed to the case without externalities in
which the grand coalition is stable (see, e.g., Mailath and Zemsky (1991)),
we demonstrate that in the presence of externalities a bidder with merging
expectations may prefer acting individually rather than participating in the
all-bidders cartel. We therefore conclude that externalities may lead to the
instability of the grand coalition.
As a last part of the paper we study collusion in auctions with externalities
as a mechanism design problem, insisting on the differences between ex-
ante and interim collusion. More specifically, we look at collusive ex-post
efficient mechanisms which are budget-balanced and incentive compatible
and compare interim individual rationality with ex-ante group participation
constraints.
As a benchmark we refer to the results of Mailath and Zemsky (1991) in
second price auctions without direct externalities. They prove the existence
of such collusive mechanisms with ex-ante group participation constraints.
In the presence of direct externalities Caillaud and Jehiel (1998) identify a
necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of an ex-post efficient
mechanism for the grand coalition which is budget-balanced, incentive com-
patible and satisfies interim individual rationality. Translating our results
as described above, (obtained in a model similar to the one of Caillaud and
Jehiel (1998)), to the language of mechanism design, the grand coalition be-
ing core-stable means the existence of an ex-post efficient mechanism for the
grand coalition which is budget-balanced, incentive compatible and satisfies
ex-ante group participation constraints.
In order to show that the ex-ante and interim approaches are not logi-
cally comparable we give two examples. In the first the grand coalition has
an ex-post efficient mechanism, which is budget balanced, incentive compat-
ible and satisfies interim individual participation constraints but not ex-ante
group participation constraints. In the second example the grand coalition
has an ex-post efficient mechanism which is budget-balanced, incentive com-
patible and satisfies ex-ante group participation constraints but is not interim
individually rational.
We insist that although interim individual rationality is stronger than
3This is the smallest auction in which the instability of the grand coalition can be
demonstrated. Examples exist for the general n-bidder case, n > 3. However, the grand
coalition is always stable in a 2-bidder auction due to symmetry and the super-additivity
of the grand coalition (see, section 5).
7
ex-ante individual rationality, comparing ex-ante and interim commitments
is difficult. Biran and Forges (2011) explain this difficulty by saying that
the decision of a coalition to block in the interim stage is a function of its
conditional expected utility given the types of its members, and therefore
one cannot use a straight forward transfer scheme for the grand coalition in
order to ensure that no coalition would block interim (as opposed to ex-ante
blocking). Finally, we conclude from this discussion that there are situations
in which the grand coalition would try to collude in the ex-ante stage (given
that such a stage can be identified), rather than letting the players learn
their types before asking them to commit.
Our paper takes the following form: Section 2 presents the model. In
section 3 we prove the existence of coalitional equilibrium in auctions with
asymmetric bidders for any given bidder partition. In section 4 we compute
the participation thresholds of bidding rings with merging and singleton ex-
pectation, which are used in section 5 to demonstrate the instability of the
grand coalition in the presence of externalities. In section 6 we study col-
lusion in auctions with externalities as a mechanism design problem, and
section 7 concludes. In appendix A we bring the proof of coalitional equi-
librium with singleton expectations, and appendix B presents simulations of
core stability of the grand coalition with singleton expectations.
2 Model
2.1 Second price auction with externalities
As in Caillaud and Jehiel (1998) we consider a single indivisible object second
price auction Γ with a reserve price R > 0, held in a market with a set of
bidders N = {1, 2, ..., n}. Bidder i assigns a valuation ti to the object, which
is the utility he derives from the object if winning it. The valuation, or type,
of i is private, and is identically and independently distributed with respect
to a common continuous density f > 0 in [t, t], with distribution F .
Additionally, symmetric direct external effects are considered. Specifi-
cally, a losing bidder suffers a negative externality e < 0. The externality
term is not identity dependent. Namely, every losing bidder gets a utility
equals to e regardless of his or the winner’s identity. The externality is,
therefore, assumed to be of common knowledge. For the sake of simplicity
we assume that the parameters maintain t < R + e as well as R < t. The
8
interpretation is that a highest type bidder is expected to participate in the
auction, whereas a lowest type is not.4
Let b ∈ Rn+ be a bidding vector. If no bidder makes a relevant bid,
i.e., maxj∈N bj < R then the seller keeps the good and all bidders get a
utility normalized to zero. Otherwise, the good is allocated to the bidder
who makes the highest bid, i, for the second highest relevant price: p =
max{R,maxj 6=i{bj}}. Considering quasi-linear utilities, i gets ti − p, while
every other bidder suffers the externality e. In case of a tie we assume that
each of the bidders who placed the highest bid wins with equal probability.
2.2 The auxiliary collusion game
We extend now the auction game to consider bidding rings. Note P a parti-
tion of N , where the interpretation is that S ∈ P is a bidding ring. We note
tS the valuation of such a ring, defined by tS = maxi∈S ti + (s − 1)e, where
s = |S|, as a bidding ring wishes to maximize its profit.
Clearly, when defining the valuation of a coalition in this way we assume
full revelation of information between coalition members. This assumption is
WLOG as Biran and Forges (2011) show that a given coalitional equilibrium
can be made I.C. with appropriate transfers within each coalition.5 Types
are therefore common knowledge inside a coalition. Hence, the distribution
of a coalition’s type in terms of the original distribution F is:
FS(t) = (F (t− (s− 1)e))s (2.1)
for all t ∈ [t+(s−1)e, t+(s−1)e]. Additionally, if S does not win the auction
it suffers an externality eS = se. Note, that the formation of coalitions clearly
violates the symmetry in the market in two different senses. First, valuations
of ”bidders”, i.e., bidding rings, in a collusive auction are not identically
distributed, as FS depends on the size of S. Second, the externality of a
losing ring depends on its identity as eS is a function of |S|.
Given a partition P we can therefore consider the auxiliary auction game
Γ(P ) where players are coalitions in P . Let b ∈ R|P |+ be a bidding vector in
Γ(P ), where the interpretation is that in every coalition the highest valuation
ring member makes a relevant bid, while the other members of the coalition
make irrelevant bids (below the reservation price) which can be conveniently
4Our results may be recovered without this assumption.
5See Biran and Forges (2011)’s corollary of proposition 1.
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ignored. Once again, WLOG we may assume full revelation of information
within a coalition, hence, such a definition of a bidding vector in Γ(P ) is
justified.
As before, if there is no relevant bid, i.e., maxS∈P bS < R then the seller
keeps the good and all coalitions get a null utility. Otherwise, the good is
allocated to the coalition S that made the highest bid, for the second highest
relevant price: p = max{R,maxT 6=S{bT}}. S derives therefore a utility of
tS−p, while every other coalition suffers the (identity dependent) externality
eS. In case of a tie we assume that each of the coalitions that placed the
highest bid wins with equal probability.
2.3 Core-stability of the grand coalition
Following Biran and Forges (2011) we address the question of the stability of
the grand coalition, applied to the considered second price auction. Roughly
speaking, they say that the grand coalition is core-stable if the core of the
underlying cooperative game is non-empty.
As a first step in defining the underlying characteristic function, they
consider for every coalition S ⊂ N , a partition B(S) such that S ∈ B(S).
B(S) is interpreted as the conjecture of S on the partitioning of the rest of
the players, N \ S, if S secedes.
Assume the existence of a coalitional equilibrium mapping σ (see, e.g.,
Ray (2007)). Namely, for every partition P of N , σ(P ) is a Nash equilibrium
of Γ(P ). With respect to σ, Biran and Forges (2011) derive a characteristic
function, wBσ , which assigns to every coalition S its (ex-ante) expected utility
in the equilibrium σ(B(S)) of the auxiliary game Γ(B(S)).
Finally, as mentioned above, they say that with respect to the mappings
σ and B the grand coalition is core-stable if the core of wBσ is non-empty.
In order to examine the stability of the grand coalition in auctions with
externalities, we start by proving the existence of a coalitional equilibrium
mapping σ (see, section 3). We then compute the coalitional equilibria given
two specific examples of (symmetric) mappings B (see, section 4).6 Finally,
we compute the corresponding characteristic functions wBσ (see, sections 5).
As the grand coalition may win the auction by offering the reserve price,
or alternatively get a zero utility if not participating (no trade), it participates
6For instance, singleton expectations yield a symmetric mapping, as every seceding
coalition conjectures that the others will partition themselves in the same way, to single-
tons. Merging expectations is another example for a symmetric mapping.
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in equilibrium if and only if the highest valuation of its members net of the
reserve price is greater than the externalities of the other two members. The
value of the grand coalition is therefore:
wBσ (N) = w(N) = E((max
i
t˜i+ (n−1)e−R)I(max
i
t˜i+ (n−1)e > R)) (2.2)
where, t˜i is a random variable with distribution F , and I is the indicator
function. Obviously, the value of the grand coalition does not depend on the
mappings σ and B (see also, e.g., Biran and Forges (2011)). If the core of the
underlying cooperative game is not empty, then by symmetry, the allocation
in which every agent gets an equal share of the value of the grand coalition
is in the core. More precisely, the core is not empty if and only if it contains
the following payment vector: (
wBσ (N)
n
)n
i=1
(2.3)
Hence, in order to prove the instability of the grand coalition, it suffices
to identify a coalition S, such that:
wBσ (N)
n
<
wBσ (S)
|S| (2.4)
Example 5.1 demonstrates a case where (2.4) holds for a singleton (i.e.,
|S| = 1) in a 3-bidder auction, illustrating the instability of the grand coali-
tion in the presence of externalities.7
3 Coalitional equilibrium
Caillaud and Jehiel (1998) prove that in a symmetric market, if no bidding
rings are considered, then for every distribution F there exists an equilibrium
in the auction, where a bidder bids his valuation augmented by the externality
term if his valuation is greater than the reserve price, and 0 otherwise. We
refer to such a strategy as a participation threshold bidding strategy with a
threshold R:
σi(ti) =
{
ti − e If ti > R
0 Otherwise
(3.1)
7This is for the sake of simplicity as demonstrating the secession of a group of players
requires more bidders which significantly complicates the computations. See also, footnote
2.
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We revise their analysis to establish the existence of equilibrium in thresh-
old strategies in collusive auctions. Fix a partition P of N and a coalition
S ∈ P . For all types tS of S and bids b ∈ R|P |+ of the participants in the
auxiliary game Γ(P ), we denote uS(tS; b) the utility of S of type tS in Γ(P )
when b is played, as defined in section 2.2. Conveniently, we denote b−S the
bidding vector of all the participants but S. Consider the following lemmas:
Lemma 3.1.
∀b−S,∀tS < R + se,∀bS ≥ R uS(tS; (0, b−S)) ≥ uS(tS; (bS, b−S))
Lemma 3.2.
∀b−S,∀tS ≥ R + se,∀bS ≥ R uS(tS; (tS − eS, b−S)) ≥ uS(tS; (bS, b−S))
Lemma 3.3.
∀b−S,∀tS > R,∀bS < R uS(tS; (tS − eS, b−S)) ≥ uS(tS; (bS, b−S))
Lemma 3.4. ∀b−S,∀(t′S, tS), t′S > tS ≥ R + se, if uS(tS; (tS − eS, b−S)) ≥
uS(tS; (bS, b−S)) for any bS < R, then
uS(t
′
S; (t
′
S − eS, b−S)) ≥ uS(t′S; (bS, b−S)) for any bS < R
The proofs of the lemmas are analogous to Caillaud and Jehiel (1998) and
are therefore omitted. Loosely speaking, we conclude from the lemmas that
in a collusive auction every bidding ring S has a ”dominant” strategy (except
for the interval [R + se, R], where a ”monotonous” behavior maintains).
Specifically, if the type of S is lower than R + se its ”best response” is
not to participate regardless of the actions of the others as by winning it
gets a utility lower than its externality (lemma 3.1). If its type is higher
than the reserve price it should participate by bidding its type augmented
by its externality (lemmas 3.2 and 3.3). Finally, if an intermediate type in
the interval [R + se, R] prefers participating then any higher type prefers
participating as well (lemma 3.4). It follows that given any strategy of the
others there exist a participation threshold strategy which is a best response.
The existence of the following tractable equilibrium in threshold strategies
follows.
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Proposition 3.5. Let P be a partition of N . Then for all S ∈ P there exists
t∗S ∈ [R + eS, R] such that the following (σS)S∈P is an equilibrium of Γ(P ):
σS(tS) =
{
tS − eS If tS > t∗S
0 Otherwise
(3.2)
We refer to t∗S as the participation threshold of S in the equilibrium σ.
An immediate implication of the proposition is that for a given valuation,
the bigger a coalition is, the higher it is likely to bid if participating. The
intuition is quite clear, as a big coalition suffers a greater externality if losing.
Finally, proposition 3.5 provides the coalitional equilibrium mapping σ
which will be used to demonstrate the instability of the grand coalition in
the presence of externalities (see, example 5.1).
4 Participation threshold
We wish to compute the coalitional equilibrium (namely, the participation
threshold of a coalition) identified in the previous section in two specific cases.
We start with the case where the complementary of a seceding coalition
forms due to a secession. Then, we go on with the case where cooperation
breaks down completely due to the secession of a coalition, namely, all players
outside the seceding coalition act individually. The first case corresponds to
the core with merging expectation (m-core) introduced by Maskin (2003),
while the second case corresponds to the core with singleton expectations
(s-core) introduced by Hafalir (2007).
4.1 Merging expectations - The two cartels case
Let us start with an analysis of the participation threshold of a coalition
which expects its complementary to act cooperatively if seceding, i.e., ∀S ⊂
N, B(S) = {S,N \ S}. Suppose, thus WLOG, that |S| > |N \ S|.8 We first
claim (proposition 4.1) that there exists an equilibrium in threshold strategies
where the participation threshold of the smaller coalition is simply the reserve
price, while that of the bigger one is in the interval [R − eN\S + eS, R]. We
then derive an explicit expression of the latter.
8In case of an equality the collusive auction is symmetric and the equilibrium reduces
to the one identified by Caillaud and Jehiel (1998). Namely, both coalitions have a par-
ticipation threshold equals to the reservation price R (see, section 3).
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Proposition 4.1. Let P = {S,N \S} where |S| > |N \S|. Then there exists
t∗S ∈ [R− eN\S + eS, R], such that t∗S and t∗N\S = R constitute an equilibrium
of Γ(P ) in threshold strategies.
Proof. Suppose first that N\S follows a bidding strategy with a participation
threshold equals to R. From the preceding analysis we conclude that there
exists a best response strategy for S with a threshold t∗S ∈ [R + eS, R]. Let
us compute the interim utility of S of type tS ≥ R + eS if it chooses to
participate in the auction and if it chooses not to participate. If S makes
an irrelevant bid, then it gets 0 if N \ S does not participate as well, and eS
otherwise, which yields:
seP (t˜N\S > R) (4.1)
where, |S| = s and t˜N\S denotes a random variable with distribution FN\S.
If on the other hand S chooses to participate, we distinguish between 3
cases. Either, N \ S does not participate in which case S wins the good for
the reserve price. Or, N \ S participates and wins, in which case S gets its
externality. Or, finally, both coalitions participate and S wins, paying the bid
of N \S. Note that as we consider threshold strategies, if a coalition chooses
to participate it bids the difference between its type and its externality (see,
(3.2)). The interim utility of S if participating is therefore:
(tS −R)P (t˜N\S ≤ R) + seP (t˜N\S > R and t˜N\S − (n− s)e > tS − se)
+ E((tS − (t˜N\S − (n− s)e))I(t˜N\S > R and t˜N\S − (n− s)e < tS − se))
(4.2)
where, |N \S| = n−s and I is the indicator function. As we consider contin-
uous distribution, ties occur with zero probability with respect to threshold
strategies.
As the interim utility functions of S if participating, (4.2), or not partici-
pating, (4.1), are continuous with respect to the type of S, we conclude that
in equilibrium, S of threshold type t∗S is indifferent between participating or
not. Namely, replacing tS with t
∗
S in (4.1) and (4.2) yields an equality:
seP (t˜N\S > R) = (t∗S −R)P (t˜N\S ≤ R) + seP (t˜N\S > max{R, t∗S
+ (n− 2s)e}) + E((t∗S − (t˜N\S − (n− s)e))I(t˜N\S > R
and t˜N\S − (n− s)e < t∗S − se))
(4.3)
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Suppose by way of contradiction that t∗S < R − eN\S + eS. Then R =
max{R, t∗S + (n − 2s)e} and I(t˜N\S > R and t˜N\S − (n − s)e < t∗S − se) =
0,∀t˜N\S. Hence, (4.3) reduces to:
0 = (t∗S −R)P (t˜N\S ≤ R) (4.4)
or equivalently, as f > 0, t∗S = R, which is a contradiction.
Suppose now that S is following a bidding strategy with a participation
threshold t∗S ∈ [R − eN\S + eS, R]. There exists a best response strategy for
N \ S with thresholds t∗N\S ∈ [R + eN\S, R]. Following the same analysis we
conclude that in equilibrium:
(n− s)eP (t˜S > t∗S) = (t∗N\S −R)P (t˜S ≤ t∗S) + (n− s)eP (t˜S > max{t∗S,
t∗N\S − (n− 2s)e}) + E((t∗N\S − (t˜S − se))I(t˜S > t∗S
and t˜S − se < t∗N\S − (n− s)e))
(4.5)
where, t˜S is a random variable with distribution FS. As t
∗
N\S ≤ R ≤ t∗S +
eN\S−eS it holds that t∗S = max{t∗S, t∗N\S−(n−2s)e} and I(t˜S > t∗S and t˜S−
se < t∗N\S − (n − s)e) = 0, ∀t˜S. It follows that t∗N\S = R, which concludes
the proof.
In order to compute the participation threshold of the bigger coalition,
we derive from (4.3):9
0 = −se(1− (F (R− (n− s− 1)e))n−s) + (t∗S −R)(F (R− (n− s− 1)e))n−s
+ se(1− (F (t∗S − (s− 1)e))n−s) +
∫ t∗S+(n−2s)e
R
(t∗S − t+ (n− s)e)(n− s)
(F (t− (n− s− 1)e))n−s−1f(t− (n− s− 1)e) dt
(4.6)
which, by integration in parts, gives a characterization of t∗S in the considered
case:
0 = −(n− 2s)e(F (R− (n− s− 1)e))n−s +
∫ t∗S−(s−1)e
R−(n−s−1)e
(F (t))n−s dt (4.7)
9For the sake of simplicity we assume here t+ (n− 2)e > R, otherwise S might have a
participation threshold which never allows it to participate in the auction. The analysis
can be repeated in the complementary case.
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Note, that there exists a unique threshold satisfying (4.7) as the function
h(τ) = −(n − 2s)e(F (R − (n − s − 1)e))n−s + ∫ τ−(s−1)e
R−(n−s−1)e(F (t))
n−s dt, τ ∈
[R− (n− 2s)e, R], is strictly increasing and maintains h(R− (n− 2s)e) ≤ 0
and h(R) ≥ 0.
4.2 Singleton expectations - The cartel vs. individuals
case
We repeat the previous analysis in a market where due to the secession of a
coalition, cooperation breaks down completely. As a result of which, all play-
ers outside the seceding coalition act individually, namely, ∀S ⊂ N, B(S) =
{S, {i}i/∈S}. We prove in a similar way (see, appendix A) that each individual
participates if his type is greater than the reserve price while the coalition
participates if its valuation exceeds some t∗S ∈ [R+(s−1)e, R], characterized
in (4.8) below.
Proposition 4.2. Let P = {S, {i}i/∈S}. Then there exists t∗S ∈ [R + (s −
1)e, R], such that t∗S and t
∗
i = R for all i /∈ S constitute an equilibrium of
Γ(P ) in threshold strategies.
Finally, as in the previous section we derive the following characterization
of t∗S in the considered case:
0 = (s− 1)e(F (R))n−s +
∫ t∗S−(s−1)e
R
(F (t))n−s dt (4.8)
As before, there exists a unique threshold satisfying (4.8).
5 Stability in a 3-player market with exter-
nalities
We consider a symmetric market with 3 players, as it is the smallest market in
which the instability of the grand coalition can be demonstrated.10 Mailath
and Zemsky (1991) prove that in a standard second price auction, without
10Due to symmetry and grand coalition superadditivity (see, e.g., Biran and Forges
(2011)) the grand coalition is always stable in a 2-player market with externalities. The
instability of the grand coalition in the presence of externalities can be demonstrated also
in the general n-player case, n ≥ 3.
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direct externalities, the grand coalition is core-stable, namely, no subset of
bidders has a profitable deviation. We wish to go further and examine the
stability of the grand coalition in the presence of externalities.
5.1 Coalitions’ values
In order to verify (2.4), namely, to compare the per-capita utility of a seceding
coalition with the per-capita utility in the grand coalition, we compute the
values of the different coalitions. Let us start with the value of the grand
coalition. Consider, therefore, the auxiliary game Γ({1, 2, 3}). Recalling
(2.2), the value (or, ex-ante utility) of the grand coalition is,
v = E((max
i
t˜i + 2e−R)I(max
i
t˜i + 2e > R)) (5.1)
Consider now a seceding coalition of two, denoted S. Note, that its value,
denoted y, does not depend on the considered mapping B. Consider, there-
fore, the auxiliary game Γ({{i}, S}). We refer to the threshold equilibrium
constructed in proposition 4.1, namely, the individual i participates if and
only if his valuation is greater than the reserve price, offering his valuation
augmented by the externality term, while the coalition S acts similarly with
respect to the participation threshold t∗ given by (4.7).11
In a similar way to the analysis in the previous section, as a first step in
computing y we compute the interim utility function of S. If the type of S
is lower than its participation threshold, tS ≤ t∗, it gets: eS if the individual
participates (i.e., if ti > R), and 0 otherwise. Its interim utility in this case
is therefore,
eSP (t˜i > R) (5.2)
If, alternatively, tS > t
∗, i.e., S participates, we distinguish between 3 cases.
If the individual does not participate, S wins the good for the reserve price
R. If the individual participates (offering his valuation augmented by the
externality term) and the coalition overbids him (offering its valuation aug-
mented by its externality) the coalition gets the good paying the offer of the
individual. Finally, if the individual overbids the coalition, then the latter
gets its externality. Hence, if participating, the coalition gets the following
11As in the computation of (4.7) we assume here t + e > R. See also footnote 9.
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interim utility:
(tS −R)P (t˜i ≤ R) + E[(tS − (t˜i − e))I(t˜i > R and tS − eS > t˜i − e)]
+ eSP (t˜i > R and tS − eS < t˜i − e) (5.3)
By taking expectations on (5.2) and (5.3), recalling (2.1), and by inte-
grating in parts, we get the value (or, ex-ante utility) of a coalition of two:
y = 2e(1− F (R)) +
∫ t
t∗−e
(F (t)− F (t)3) dt (5.4)
with a (unique) participation threshold t∗ (see, (4.7)) given by:
0 = eF (R) +
∫ t∗−e
R
F (t) dt (5.5)
Finally, we need to compute the value of a seceding single player. We
need to distinguish between two cases. With merging expectations the value
of a seceding individual is his ex-ante utility with respect to the equilibrium
σ({{i}, S}), denoted z. With singleton expectations his value is his ex-ante
utility w.r.t σ({{1}, {2}, {3}}), denoted x.
In a similar way to the computation of the term y above we get:
z = F (t∗ − e)2(t∗ − 2e−R) + e− F (t∗ − e)2
∫ t∗−e
R
F (t) dt
+
∫ t
t∗−e
(F (t)2 − F (t)3) dt
(5.6)
In order to compute x, recall that the participation threshold of any
individual in this case is the reserve price R. If t1 ≤ R, 1 gets e if any of
the others participates and 0 otherwise, which yields his interim utility if not
participating:
eP (max{t˜2, t˜3} > R) (5.7)
If t1 > R, the interim utility of 1 is:
(t1−R)P (max{t˜2, t˜3} ≤ R)+E[(t1−(max{t˜2, t˜3}−e))I(max{t˜2, t˜3} > R and
t1−e > max{t˜2, t˜3}−e)]+eP (max{t˜2, t˜3} > R and t1−e < max{t˜2, t˜3}−e)
(5.8)
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The distribution of max{t˜2, t˜3} being F 2, we conclude by taking expectations
on the interim utilities and integrating in parts that the ex-ante utility of an
individual facing two other individuals is:
x = e(1− F (R)2) +
∫ t
R
(F (t)2 − F (t)3) dt (5.9)
5.2 Emptiness of the core
As stated above in order to examine the stability of the grand coalition we
need to verify whether a coalition of two players or an individual can gain
more by not cooperating. By symmetry, a coalition of two players secedes if
y
2
> v
3
. However, if an individual secedes, there are two possible partitions
for the remaining two agents. To demonstrate the instability of the grand
coalition in the presence of externalities we focus on merging expectations
(m-core), namely, a seceding individual expects the others to form the com-
plementary cartel. Therefore, by symmetry, an individual profitably secedes
if z > v
3
.12
We conclude that the grand coalition is m-core-stable, (i.e., the m-core is
non-empty), if and only if:13
z ≤ v
3
and
y
2
≤ v
3
(5.10)
Consider first, as a benchmark, a market without externalities. We know
that in such a market offering one’s valuation, as long as it is higher than
the reserve price, constitutes an equilibrium in weakly dominant strategies.
Recalling that the valuation of a coalition is equal to the maximal type of its
members, Biran and Forges (2011) prove that the partition function reduces
in this case to a characteristic function. In other words, in the absence of
externalities the value of a coalition does not depend on the mapping B. In
particular, the s-core and the m-core coincide, and x = z. Furthermore, they
12Note that an individual with singleton expectations will not deviate as by grand
coalition superadditivity x ≤ v3 .
13As for the core with singleton expectations (s-core), it is non-empty if and only if:
y
2
≤ v
3
(5.11)
It follows that the s-core contains the m-core in a 3-player market.
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prove that without externalities all rings are core-stable (see also Mailath and
Zemsky (1991) and Barbar and Forges (2007)).14
Introducing direct externalities between agents interferes severely with
cooperation. While as collusion reduces competition which leads to potential
greater profits due to price reduction, agents find it more difficult to collude
in the presence of externalities as in large coalitions the cumulating effect of
negative externalities decreases dramatically the coalition’s net profit.
In the following example an individual facing a cartel of two gains more
than if he chooses to join the cartel in order to form the grand coalition.
We therefore conclude that the grand coalition is not stable with merging
expectations.
Example 5.1. Consider a 3-agent symmetric market where the valuation
each agent assigns to the good is distributed uniformly in the unit interval,
F ∼ U [0, 1]. A second price auction is held in this market with a reserve
price R = 9
10
. The externality on a non-winning agent is e = −1
4
. Note
that as 1 + 2e < R, if the grand coalition forms it profitably chooses not to
participate in the auction. Hence, v = 0. By (5.6) it is readily verified that
z > 0, hence an individual expecting the others to act cooperatively in case
he secedes from the grand coalition, will profitably act independently. The
grand coalition is therefore instable with merging expectation.
Note, that considering ”merging expectations” in the example is easily
justified. Once a player secedes from the grand coalition the remaining two
players can either cooperate and get y
2
each, or further split up gaining x
each. From (5.4) and (5.9) we learn that y
2
> x in the example, hence, the
remaining two players will profitably cooperate.
The individual’s behavior in the example can also be interpreted as ”free-
riding”. If he forms a coalition with the two other agents he gets a null
payoff. By letting the two others form a coalition he gains a higher payoff,
z > 0.
Let us note that stability is violated in the presence of externalities also
when externalities are close to zero. One should not expect some sort of
continuity, in the sense that for a small enough externality term all coalitions
remain stable. This discontinuity may be explained, for instance, by the fact
that for any negative externality the utility of a coalition depends on the
14The stability of a coalition of two players may also be recovered from Waehrer (1999).
He proves that in the absence of externalities the per capita share in a second price auction
increases with the size of the coalition. Specifically, y2 ≥ z = x.
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partition of the others. In particular, we can consider an externality term
as small as we wish, for a large enough reserve price, the instability with
merging expectations demonstrated in the example maintains.
As a concluding remark for this section we recall a property proved by
Waehrer (1999): the per capita share in a second price auction increases with
the size of the coalition. As the example shows, the property does not extend
to markets with direct externalities. Specifically, we obtain in the example
y
2
< z.
6 Collusive mechanisms
The question of collusion in auctions is frequently addressed in the literature
as a mechanism design problem. Loosely speaking, a collusive mechanism for
the grand coalition determines the bidding profile of the players, as well as
transfer payments between them in order to share the coalition’s gain. When
studying collusion in auctions with the means of mechanism design, we try
to establish which properties the collusive mechanism may possess.
Consider a second price auction with independent private value (IPV)
without direct externalities between bidders. Mailath and Zemsky (1991)
construct a collusive mechanism for the grand coalition (with heterogeneous
bidders) which is ex-post efficient, incentive compatible (IC), interim indi-
vidually rational (IR) and budget-balanced (BB).15 As is well known, IPV
second price auctions have an equilibrium in weakly dominant strategies,
where every bidder bids his type, or valuation. Full revelation within bid-
ding rings yields an analogous result in collusive auctions, namely, a ring
submits in equilibrium a bid equals to the highest valuation of its members
(see, e.g., Biran and Forges (2011)). In particular a ring conveys no strategic
externality upon players outside the ring, since the ring’s highest type mem-
ber would make the same bid if the ring did not collude. This allows Mailath
and Zemsky (1991) to prove the ”coalitional stability” of the grand coalition,
namely, the existence of a mechanism for the grand coalition which is ex-post
efficient, IC, BB and satisfies ex-ante group participation constraints.16
15Allowing agreements which involve the seller as well, Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983)
prove an impossibility theorem regarding the existence of an ex-post efficient, BB, IC,
interim IR mechanism. This indicates that in this result, the seller takes an important
part with respect to the (in)stability of collusive agreements.
16Mailath and Zemsky (1991) prove the existence of such a mechanism using the famous
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Caillaud and Jehiel (1998) study collusion in auctions with direct exter-
nalities where individual bidders decide whether to participate in the grand
coalition at the interim stage. They mainly assume that bidders have veto
power, namely, the refusal of a bidder to participate in the grand coalition
leads to an auction where all bidders act individually.17 They prove that the
following condition is necessary and sufficient for the existence of a mecha-
nism for the grand coalition which is ex-post efficient, BB, IC and interim
IR:
e+
∫ t
R+e
F (t)n−1 dt ≤ 1
n
v +
∫ t
t
(∫ t
max{τ,R−(n−1)e}
F (t)n−1 dt
)
f(τ) dτ (6.1)
whenever R ≤ t + (n − 1)e. In the complementary case, namely, when the
grand coalition has absolutely no interest in participating in the auction,
whatever its valuation is, the necessary and sufficient condition for the exis-
tence of a mechanism for the grand coalition which is ex-post efficient, BB,
IC and interim IR is:
e+
∫ t
R+e
F (t)n−1 dt ≤ 0 (6.2)
It can be verified that in the case without direct externalities (e =
0) the necessary and sufficient condition identified by Caillaud and Jehiel
(1998) holds, which in turn revalidates the result of Mailath and Zemsky
(1991) regarding the existence of an ex-post efficient mechanism for the
grand coalition which is IC, BB and interim IR. Specifically, as e = 0 it
holds that R ≤ t + (n − 1)e and we should therefore look at condition
(6.1). Changing the order of integration in the RHS of (6.1) replacing
v = E((maxi t˜i + (n − 1)e − R)I(maxi t˜i + (n − 1)e > R)) (see, (2.2)) and
setting e = 0 yields,
Bondareva-Shapley theorem (see, e.g., Shapley (1967)). In particular, no constructive
proof is available, as opposed to the case with interim individual participation constraints,
as mentioned above.
17Caillaud and Jehiel (1998) state that one can assume veto power to bidders without
loss of generality. Since they define the individual rationality level of i as his minmax
payoff, it indeed does not depend on the partitioning of N \ {i}. Nevertheless, in our
model individual rationality levels are calculated in equilibrium and do depend on the
partitioning of the others, as demonstrated by example 5.1.
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∫ t
R
F (t)n−1 dt ≤
∫ t
R
(t−R)F (t)n−1f(t) dt+
∫ t
R
F (t)n dt (6.3)
Integrating in parts the first integral in the RHS of (6.3) yields the fol-
lowing equivalent inequality:∫ t
R
F (t)n−1 dt ≤
∫ t
R
1
n
(1 + (n− 1)F (t)n) dt (6.4)
which can be verified by looking at the difference between the integrand
in the RHS of (6.4) and the integrand in the LHS of (6.4) as a function of
the type in the interval [t, t]. This function is non-increasing and is equal to
0 in t.
With respect to Caillaud and Jehiel (1998)’s condition, consider example
5.1. In terms of mechanism design, the coalitional equilibrium considered
in the example yields a mechanism for the grand coalition which is ex-post
efficient, BB and IC.18 The fact that a single player (with merging expecta-
tions) prefers seceding at the ex-ante stage in this example means that the
mechanism fails to be ex-ante IR.
As ex-ante IR is a weaker property than interim IR, such a mechanism
would also fail to be interim IR given that an individual has merging expec-
tations, in particular, without veto power. Nevertheless, it can be readily
verified that condition (6.2) does hold in this example, which means that the
grand coalition has an ex-post efficient, BB, IC and interim IR mechanism if
individuals have veto power. We conclude that the veto power assumption
is strong.
To complete the discussion we propose another example, where the grand
coalition is core-stable while as the necessary and sufficient condition of Cail-
laud and Jehiel (1998) does not hold. The interpretation is that there exists
an ex-post efficient mechanism for the grand coalition which is BB, IC and
satisfies ex-ante group participation constraints (for groups with either merg-
ing or singleton expectations, i.e., veto power or not), yet a mechanism for
the grand coalition which is ex-post efficient, BB and IC, fails to be interim
IR.
18While we follow an ex-ante approach, we achieve ex-ante incentive efficiency in the
grand coalition by constructing an ex-post efficient mechanism which is also incentive
compatible (see also, e.g., Holmstrom and Myerson (1983), Mas-Colell et al. (1995)).
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Example 6.1. Consider a 3-player symmetric market where the valuation
that each player assigns to the good is distributed uniformly in the unit
interval, F ∼ U [0, 1]. A second price auction is held in this market with a
reserve price R = 3
5
. The externality on a non-winning agent is e = −1
4
.
Note that as 1 + 2e < R if the grand coalition forms it profitably chooses not
to participate in the auction.19 It is readily verified that the LHS of (6.2) is
positive, therefore, condition (6.2) does not hold.
Once again, as 1 + 2e < R, the grand coalition is not expected to partic-
ipate in the auction, namely v = 0. It can be readily verified that y, z < 0
(see, (5.4) and (5.6)), hence, the m-core of this game is non-empty (see,
(5.10)), which in turn yields that the s-core is not empty as well (see, foot-
note 13). Hence the grand coalition is ex-ante core stable with both merging
or singleton expectations.
The latter example demonstrates the existence of an ex-post efficient, IC
and BB mechanism which satisfies ex-ante group participation constraints
while interim IR fails to be maintained. We find this result important for two
reasons. First, the context of the mechanism design problem might be so that
agents have to commit ex-ante, the interim stage being too late for collusion.
Consider, for instance, the example of an art auction previously mentioned
(see, e.g., section 1.1) where waiting for the art object to be available at the
auction house for close examination by experts on behalf of the art collectors
(i.e., interim stage) might be too adjacent to the auction, leaving no time
for coalition formation negotiations. Another example, Porter and Zona
(1999) study collusion in school milk procurements in Ohio where local diaries
formed a bidding ring which repeatedly participated in the yearly school
milk procurement. Forming a ring with the intention to participate in future
auctions explicitly assumes the ability and willing of players to commit ex-
ante. That is since the auction details are not yet published while collusion
takes place, and therefore the players cannot calculate their cost if winning,
and in particular they cannot calculate their valuations or types.
A second reason relates to the point of view of the colluding ring. As
proved by Biran and Forges (2011) a coalition can strive to achieve a ”first
best” solution at the ex-ante stage, namely, a collusive mechanism which
is ex-post efficient, and satisfies group participation constraints, which can
be made IC by implementing an appropriate balanced transfer scheme, as
19The same example can be revisited with the parameters R = 12 and e = − 15 for which
the grand coalition does participate in the auction.
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introduced, for instance, by Groves (1973). It is well known that a transfer
scheme of that kind usually fails from being IR at the interim stage, leaving
the coalition with a ”second best” solution.
Moreover, as already explained by Biran and Forges (2011), defining
group participation constraints in the interim stage is difficult. The deci-
sion of a coalition to secede in the interim stage is a function of its ”type”.
But what is the ”type” of a coalition? How, and to what extent, do coali-
tion members share their information, if at all?20 Moreover, formulating in-
terim blocking as a function of the conditional expected utility of a coalition
given its ”type” raises another difficulty. As opposed to the ex-ante blocking
case, one can no longer use straight forward transfer payments between the
members of the grand coalition in order to avoid all coalitions from block-
ing. Nevertheless, in example 6.1 an individual is blocking in the interim
stage. Therefore, even if we could define group participation constraints in
the interim stage, the grand coalition would be interim blocked, although, as
demonstrated above, it would not be blocked in the ex-ante stage by both
individuals and groups. We conclude that in this example the grand coalition
would prefer colluding in the ex-ante stage.
7 Conclusion
We considered a second price auction in the presence of externalities, studying
the question of the core stability of the grand coalition. We derived an
auxiliary auction game between coalitions, or bidding rings, from the original
non-collusive auction game, defining the valuation of a coalition as the highest
valuation of its members net of the externalities of the coalition’s members.
We then proved the existence of a Nash equilibrium in the auxiliary game for
any given partition of the bidders, computing it specifically in two concrete
cases. The merging expectations case, where a seceding coalition conjectures
that the others will form a complementary coalition. And the singleton
expectations case, where a seceding coalition conjectures that the others will
act individually.
Given these results, we showed that as opposed to the case without exter-
nalities where the grand coalition is always stable, the presence of external-
20Biran and Forges (2011) propose looking at the incentive compatible coarse-core (see,
e.g., Vohra (1999)), where coalitions block on the basis of common knowledge events, i.e.,
communication between coalition members is reduced to a minimal level.
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ities makes cooperation harder. In particular, we demonstrated an auction
with three bidders, where a singleton with merging expectations prefers act-
ing individually than joining the grand coalition, as early as in the ex-ante
stage. It follows that the grand coalition is not necessarily stable in the
presence of externalities.
Finally, we studied collusion in auctions using mechanism design tools.
We showed that ex-ante and interim commitments are not logically depen-
dent, insisting on the difficulty to define interim group participation con-
straints, and demonstrating an auction where the grand coalition would pre-
fer to collude as early as in the ex-ante stage.
A Appendix: Participation threshold of a coali-
tion facing individuals
Proof of proposition 4.2. Suppose first that all i /∈ S follow a bidding strat-
egy with a participation threshold equals to R. Then S has a best response
strategy with a threshold t∗S ∈ [R+eS, R]. Let us compute the interim utility
of S of type t∗S if it chooses to participate in the auction and if it chooses not
to participate. If S makes an irrelevant bid, then it gets 0 if all i /∈ S do not
participate as well, and eS otherwise, which yields:
seP (max
i/∈S
t˜i > R) (A.1)
where t˜i denotes a random variable with distribution F .
If on the other hand S chooses to participate, we distinguish between
three cases. Either all i /∈ S do not participate, in which case S wins the
good for the reserve price. Either there is some i /∈ S who participates and
wins, in which case S gets its externality. Or finally there is some i /∈ S who
participates, however S wins paying the second highest bid max
i/∈S
t˜i − e. The
interim utility of S is therefore:
(t∗S −R)P (max
i/∈S
t˜i ≤ R) + seP (max
i/∈S
t˜i > R and max
i/∈S
t˜i − e > t∗S − se)
+ E((t∗S − (max
i/∈S
t˜i − e))I(max
i/∈S
t˜i > R and max
i/∈S
t˜i − e < t∗S − se)) (A.2)
In equilibrium S of type t∗S is indifferent between participating or not.
Suppose by way of contradiction that t∗S < R + (s − 1)e. Then R =
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max{R, t∗S − (s − 1)e} and I(max
i/∈S
t˜i > R and max
i/∈S
t˜i − e < t∗S − se) =
0,∀(t˜i)i/∈S. Hence,
seP (max
i/∈S
t˜i > R) = (t
∗
S −R)P (max
i/∈S
t˜i ≤ R) + seP (max
i/∈S
t˜i > R) (A.3)
or equivalently, t∗S = R, which is a contradiction.
Suppose now WLOG that 1 /∈ S and that S is following a bidding strategy
with a participation threshold t∗S ∈ [R+(s−1)e, R], while all the individuals
but 1 follow a strategy with a threshold R. There exists a best response
strategy for 1 with threshold t∗1 ∈ [R+ e, R]. Following the same analysis we
conclude that in equilibrium:
eP ( max
i/∈S∪{1}
t˜i > R or t˜S > t
∗
S) = (t
∗
1 −R)P ( max
i/∈S∪{1}
t˜i ≤ R and t˜S ≤ t∗S)
+ eP ( max
i/∈S∪{1}
t˜i > max{R, t∗1}
or t˜S > max{t∗S, t∗1 + (s− 1)e})
+ E((t∗1 −max{ max
i/∈S∪{1}
t˜i − e, t˜S − se})
I( max
i/∈S∪{1}
t˜i ∈ (R, t∗1]
or t˜S ∈ (t∗S, t∗1 + (s− 1)e])
(A.4)
It follows that t∗1 = R.
B Appendix: Simulations of core stability of
the grand coalition with singleton expec-
tations
We consider in this appendix singleton expectations, namely, a deviating
coalition expects the others to act individually. We present several simula-
tions of markets with three agents, showing that the grand coalition is core
stable with singleton expectations, i.e., the s-core is non-empty. We note,
however, that given example 5.1 where the grand coalition was proved to be
unstable with merging expectation, the question of the stability of the grand
coalition in a given market depends strongly on the conjecture of a seceding
coalition on the partitioning of the remaining bidders.
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We first recall, with respect to the notations in section 5, that the s-core
is non-empty if and only if y
2
≤ v
3
. Namely, the per capita utility in a coalition
of two if seceding is lower than the per capita utility in the grand coalition
(see, (5.11)).
We consider symmetric markets where the valuation that each player
assigns to the good is distributed uniformly in the unit interval, F ∼ U [0, 1].
According to the parameters of the market, (i.e., the reservation price, R, and
the externality term, e), we distinguish between two market types . The first
market type maintains R < 1 + 2e, namely, a maximal type grand coalition
participates in the auction as it can gain a positive utility by bidding the
reserve price.
The second type maintains R > 1 + 2e, which means that for any type
realization, the grand coalition, if it forms, does not participate in the auc-
tion. Nevertheless, we also demand R < 1 + e to avoid a degenerated case,
where a coalition of two players does not participate as well.21
We executed the following MATLAB simulation using the Symbolic Math
Toolbox in order to calculate: v, y, z, x. (Correspondingly, the payoff of:
The grand coalition; Coalition of two; Singleton facing a coalition of two;
Singleton facing two individuals.)22
syms t;
v = @(e,R) int((t+2*e-R)*3*t^2,R-2*e,1);
% tstar is the participation threshold of a coalition of two
tstar = @(e,R) e+sqrt(R^2-2*e*R);
y = @(e,R) 2*e*(1-R)+int(t-t^3,tstar(e,R)-e,1);
z = @(e,R) (tstar(e,R)-e)^2*(tstar(e,R)-2*e-R)+e-
(tstar(e,R)-e)^2*int(t,R,tstar(e,R)-e)+
int(t^2-t^3,tstar(e,R)-e,1);
x = @(e,R) e*(1-R^2)+int(t^2-t^3,R,1);
The following table presents the simulation results in markets of the first
type (i.e., the grand coalition may participate):
21Simulations ran in the complementary case, 1 + 2e > R > 1 + e, also find the grand
coalition core stable with singleton expectations.
22In the second market type, as the grand coalition does not participate, we simply set:
v = 0;
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R e v y z x
0.01 -0.005 0.73 0.24 0.078 0.078
0.99 -0.001 9.5 · 10−5 6 · 10−5 3.1 · 10−5 2.9 · 10−5
0.33 -0.32 0.001 -0.31 -0.13 -0.21
0.5 -0.2 0.014 -0.124 -0.045 -0.093
It can be readily verified that all simulations maintain y
2
≤ v
3
, namely, the
grand coalition is core stable with singleton expectations.
Simulation results of markets of the second type, i.e., the grand coalition
does not participate, are presented in the following table:
R e v y z x
0.34 -0.33 0 -0.33 -0.13 -0.22
0.99 -0.007 0 −1.3 · 10−4 7.4 · 10−6 −9 · 10−5
0.5 -0.49 0 -0.47 -0.03 -0.31
0.9 -0.25 0 -0.03 0.07 -0.04
Here also, all simulations maintain y
2
≤ v
3
. Note, that the last simulation
corresponds to the market from example 5.1, where the grand coalition was
not core stable with merging expectations.
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